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I nt h i ss h o r tn o t ew ed i s c u s sh o wposterior implementation, due to Green
and Laﬀont (1987), relates to ex-post implementation for which Jehiel et. al
(2005) have established a strong impossibility result.
In contrast to most other notions of implementation, posterior implemen-
tation is deﬁned with respect to the information released by the mechanism.
It requires that agents’ strategies are optimal against others’ strategies, given
the precise information made available by the mechanism. It can be inter-
preted as a regret-free form of implementation: even after agents gain new
information by observing some speciﬁed features of the mechanism’s out-
come, they are still willing to stick to their original strategy.
This notion of regret-free implementation (which can be viewed as ro-
bustness with respect to the timing of choice) is diﬀerent from the notion of
robust- implementation that refers to the agent’ prior beliefs and higher-order
beliefs. As shown by Bergemann and Morris (2004), robust implementation
coincides with ex-post implementation in a large class of environments with
quasi-linear preferences, and thus it constitutes the main motivation for ex-
post implementation.
Despite the stark diﬀerence in interpretation, note that, if the informa-
tion released by the mechanism includes all players’ types, then posterior
implementation coincides with ex post implementation. At the other ex-
treme, if no further information is made available to agents, then posterior
implementation coincides with Bayes-Nash implementation.
Particularly in settings where signals spaces are of higher dimension than
actions spaces, some form of posterior implementation may be possible even
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1if ex-post implementation fails (since in such settings agents are able to make
only limited inferences about the signals behind particular actions).
For any setting where Bayes-Nash implementation of some social choice
function is possible with respect to some priors, but where ex-post imple-
mentation fails, there will be some ”maximal information mechanism” that
allows for posterior implementation, and one could study the properties of
these mechanisms.
To illustrate the idea of posterior implementation, consider the following
auction setup:
• There are two bidders i ∈ {1,2} c o m p e t i n gf o ras i n g l eu n i to fa n
indivisible object.
• Bidders have two-dimensional signals si =( pi,c i) ∈ [0,1]
2 ;
• The signals (pi,c i) are uniformly and independently distributed on
[0,1]
2.
• The valuation of bidder i is given by vi (si,s −i)=pi + cic−i.
Claim:
• The second-price auction has a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium with
an associated non-trivial allocation function.
• This equilibrium is also posterior with respect to the policy of revealing
bids.
• If the object must be sold, only trivial allocation functions are ex-post
implementable2.
Proof. 1) We construct a symmetric equilibrium in continuous, strictly
monotonic increasing bid functions b :[ 0 ,1]
2 → R. A necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for equilibrium is that each type (p,c)i si n d i ﬀerent between




















2If the object is allowed to stay with the seller (an alternative constantly valued at zero






Given signals’ independence, the right hand side is equal to pi + cic(b).
Here, c(x)=Es−i [c|b(p,c)=x] is the expectation of the opponent’s common
values signal given that he makes bid x. This shows that the iso-bid curves
b−1 (x)m u s tb es t r a i g h tl i n e sw i t hs l o p e− 1
c(x) in the (p,c)-space [0,1]
2.S o m e
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for x ∈ [1,2]
These iso-bid lines are drawn in ﬁgure 1.
2) Assume that bids (but nothing else) are made public after the auction.
Posterior implementation with respect to this disclosure policy requires opti-
mality of each player’s bid given other players’ actual (rather than expected)
bids. It is readily veriﬁed that the equilibrium exhibited above has this prop-
erty: conditional on observing the bid x of bidder −i,b i d d e ri makes the
inference that the expected value of c−i is Es−i[c−i | b(p−i,c −i)=x], and
therefore she is not willing to modify her bid.
3) It is easily checked that the above is not an ex post equilibrium:
assume that (−i)’s signal is s−i =( p−i,c −i),w h i l ei0s signal si =( pi,c i)
satisﬁes pi+cic−i−b(s−i) > 0a n db(si) <b (s−i) . Then, after being informed
about (−i)0s signal, i prefers bidding above b(s−i)r a t h e rt h a nb(si).
3For the impossibility result, we deﬁne the two alternatives ”i gets the
object” and ”(−i) gets the object”, and we apply Proposition 3.6 of Jehiel
et al. (2005). The relative valuations are given by µi = pi + cic−i and
µ−i = −p−i − cic−i.A s s u m e t h a t ( ψ,t) is a non-trivial ex-post incentive
compatible mechanism with continuous relative transfers. Condition (1) of
Proposition 3.6 in Jehiel et al. (2005) requires the existence of an indiﬀerence
signal b s ∈ (0,1)
4, of a vector (ya,y b)














for all c−i in a neighborhood of b c−i.B yt h eﬁrst equation, λ(c−i) is indepen-
dent of c−i and equal to −ya. But the second equation λ(c−i)c−i = −c−i−yb
can be satisﬁed for a continuum of c−i only if λ(c−i) ≡− 1. This is in contra-
diction to λ(c−i) ∈ R+. Alternatively, a consideration of the cross product
−c−i−yb+yac−i =0y i e l d syb =0a n dya = 1. This shows again that ∇siµi (s)
and (∇siµ−i (s)−(1,0)
T) are co-linear (but point in opposite directions).3
References
[1] Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2004), “Robust Mechanism Design,” Dis-
cussion Paper, Yale University.
[2] Bikhchandani, S., “The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation Revisited,”
Mimeo, UCLA.
[3] Green, J. and J. J. Laﬀont (1987),“’Posterior Implementation in a Two-
Person Decision Problem,”’ Econometrica 55,6 9 - 9 4 .
[4] Jehiel, P., M. Meyer-ter-Vehn, and B. Moldovanu and W. Zame (2005),
“The Limits of Ex Post Implementation”, mimeo.
3T os e et h a tc o n d i t i o n( 2 )o ft h a tP r o p o s i t i o ni s n ’ ts a t i s ﬁed either, note that the di-
rection of ∇siµi (s)=
¡
1,c −i¢T cannot be locally independent of s−i.T h u s , n o n - t r i v i a l
implementation fails also with discontinuous transfers.
4